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INTRODUCTION
In January 2003, Governor George Ryan of Illinois pardoned
four condemned prisoners and commuted the sentences of the 163
remaining death row prisoners to sentences of life in prison.1 In so
doing, he brought national attention to a new abolitionism that has
been developing in the shadow of America's apparent pro-death
* Professor of Law/Jurisprudence and Social Policy, University of California, Berkeley.
B.A., 1982, J.D., 1987, Ph.D., 1990, University of California, Berkeley. Professor Simon
would like to thank Anthony Alfieri, Stephen Garvey, and Austin Sarat for the inspiration
of their participation in the colloquium and Judith Randle and Chrysanthi Leon for their
research assistance.
1. Don Babwin, Board Feels Deceived by Ryan, Some Say, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Jan. 16, 2003, at Al.
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penalty consensus.2 It is too early to know whether Ryan's actions
constitute a significant precedent for other political leaders. In
general, American chief executives in recent decades have become
extremely reluctant to use their clemency powers in capital cases.3
Ryan's willingness to buck this trend reflects in part the unique
circumstances present in Illinois at the time of Ryan's dramatic move.
The exoneration of seventeen death row inmates since the
resumption of capital punishment in Illinois in 1977, including three
in 1999, revealed a broad pattern of mistakes and misconduct by law
enforcement and prosecutors in death penalty cases.4 Facing a storm
of media attention surrounding the problem of wrongful convictions,
Governor Ryan appointed a Governor's Commission on Capital
Punishment, which issued a report in April 2002, deeply critical of the
death penalty's operation and criminal investigations generally in
Illinois. The Commission proposed sweeping changes in the areas of
law enforcement and prosecution of capital cases.' While other states
have had problems with some death penalty cases, few have a known
record as palpably bad as Illinois. No other state possessed the
unique conditions provided by the findings of the commission that
Ryan himself had appointed. The commission's broad condemnation
specifically called for major structural reforms both to the death
penalty and to the general practices of prosecutors and law
2. While the old abolitionism was primarily based on the view that the death penalty
was incompatible with the evolving sensibilities of society, the new abolitionism focuses on
the practical problems posed by state killing, including: the danger of executing the
innocent, the intractable residues of racism in the operation of the death penalty system,
and the consequences of executions on correctional workers as well as families of both
victims and condemned prisoners. See generally BEYOND REPAIR?: AMERICA'S DEATH
PENALTY (Stephen H. Garvey ed., 2003) (containing essays critiquing the modern death
penalty in the United States and addressing capital punishment as it relates to public
opinion, the issue of innocence, race, capital juries, and international law); AUSTIN
SARAT, WHEN THE STATE KILLS: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN
CONDITION (2001) (exploring the political, legal, and cultural aspects of capital
punishment in the United States and the new abolitionist movement); FRANKLIN E.
ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2003)
(exposing the conflicts within the cultural and legal conceptions of the death penalty and
arguing for its abolition). Several scholars have suggested that the pro-death penalty
consensus in America hides deep divisions on the details of its operation. See generally
BEYOND REPAIR, supra; SARAT, supra; ZIMRING, supra.
3. See STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 291
(2002).
4. SCOTT? TUROW, ULTIMATE PUNISHMENT: A LAWYER'S REFLECTIONS ON
DEALING WITH THE DEATH PENALTY 9-11 (2003).
5. See REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, (April
2002), http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/commission-report/complete- report.pdf,
at 187 (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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enforcement agencies. The report therefore provided compelling
reasons that few other governors have thus far faced. Moreover,
Governor Ryan's own political future had already been severely
undermined by a scandal involving his tenure as Illinois' Secretary of
State.6  Since that time, no other governors or gubernatorial
candidates have followed Ryan's lead, either in commuting death
sentences or pursuing claims of wrongful conviction that inmates have
raised in virtually every death penalty state.
Governor Ryan's decision also unleashed a storm of criticism
from victims' families, prosecutors, the media, and politicians across
the political spectrum.7 The negative reaction towards Ryan opens a
revealing window into the relationships of power and knowledge that
bind American politicians (especially elected executive officials) to
crime victims, and especially to close relatives of people who have
been murdered. This relationship is even more powerful in the
majority of American states where capital punishment is an available
punishment for murder.' In these states, in varying ways, the relatives
of capital crime victims are allowed, even expected to speak about
their injuries, and this speech operates both within and outside the
legal forum of the capital trial. Indeed, it is revealing to consider
capital punishment, independent of its larger purposes or functions,
as investing a new body of discourse, the speech of capital victims,
with extraordinary political significance.
Ryan's speech announcing the commutations at Northwestern
University Law School on January 11, 2003, will doubtless be
remembered as one of the landmarks in the emergence of a new
6. Beginning early in his term as Governor, Ryan was plagued by rumors that he
would be implicated in a growing scandal involving corruption in the office of the Illinois
Secretary of State during Ryan's tenure. George Ryan Indicted; Events Leading to Ryan's
Indictment, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 18, 2003, at C19. On December 17, 2003, Ryan was charged
with eighteen counts of racketeering, conspiracy, mail fraud, making false statements, and
income tax violations. Id.
7. Lee Hockstader, Dead Men Walking, WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 2003, § W
(Magazine), at 24.
8. States that have the death penalty are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
Washington, and Wyoming. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 2002 (Nov. 2003), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cpO2.pd at
1-2 (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). States that do not have the death
penalty are: Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, North
Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id. Other United States
jurisdictions that do not have the death penalty are: Puerto Rico and Washington, D.C. Id.
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abolitionism. The political impact of Ryan's speech, however, had
already been profoundly shaped by the speech acts of capital crime
victims at clemency hearings held in October and November 2002 in
response to the Governor's public pronouncement that he was
considering the possibility of broad commutations. Although he
chose not to attend any of the hearings directly, Governor Ryan could
not easily ignore the outpouring of anguished testimony that was
closely covered by the Illinois and national media. Retelling the
horrifying details of the murders, and relating their own agony in
revisiting the details of the crimes, the Illinois capital crime victims by
all accounts turned public attention away from the harsh criticism
earlier made of the Illinois law enforcement agencies and toward the
savagery of the crimes that brought most of the death row prisoners
to their condemnations. Weeks of dramatic testimony led newspaper
editorial pages to turn against the clemency process. Governor Ryan
himself backed away from earlier hints that he was considering a
blanket clemency of death row prisoners, although this is what he
ultimately did.9
This Essay turns to the Illinois clemency hearings, and the capital
crime victim speech they produced, to further explore the normative
implications of this kind of discourse and its legal valorization. It
argues that capital sentencing and its satellite procedures (like
clemency hearings) have the unintended consequence of unleashing a
new (or rather very old) model of how truth is produced in the service
of governance, a "game of truth" quite foreign to the way power and
knowledge have operated within modern forms of law and
administration. Capital victim speech can be squeezed into existing
categories of evidence, but a broader account of its features requires
us to reflect on alternative models.'0
The Illinois clemency hearings provided a remarkable instance of
the emergence of the victim as an important focus for criminal
justice11 and for the larger political order-what sociologists of
9. See John Keilman, Clemency Hearings a Study in Anguish, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 28,
2002, at 1 (describing clemency hearings for Illinois death row inmates).
10. See, e.g., Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 503 (1987) (stating that the prosecution
claimed that victim speech was evidence of a "circumstance" of the crime).
11. See DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL
ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 121 (2001) ("In stark contrast to previous policy,
victims have become a favoured constituency and the aim of serving victims has become
part of the redefined mission of all criminal justice agencies."); see also HANS
BOUTELLIER, CRIME AND MORALITY: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN
POST-MODERN CULTURE 47 (2000) ("Without exaggeration, the reinforced position of
the victim is the most important post-war development in the practice of criminal law.").
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punishment point to as the most distinctive feature of contemporary
penalty. David Garland describes this as a dramatic change from the
generally marginal place of crime victims held in the modern criminal
law and administration as it developed in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. "The crime victim is no longer represented as an
unfortunate citizen who has been on the receiving end of a criminal
harm .... Instead, the crime victim is now, in a certain sense, a
representative character whose experience is assumed to be common
and collective, rather than individual and atypical."12
Legal theorists have also noted the increasing importance of the
crime victim in the legal process. For the most part, these theorists
have raised concerns about what their legal recognition does both to
the victims and to the broader legal and political process. Critics
argue that victim rhetoric undermines the stability and certainty of
the legal process, introducing elements of incommensurable truth and
leading to contests over who is a more genuine victim.13 Victim
speech also pushes the capital sentencing process away from classical
and modern goals of criminal law like deterrence and retribution, and
toward an embrace of vengeance.14 Critics also suggest that victims
are themselves harmed by a logic that ties them to a debilitating
account of their own state of injury, thus producing passive
supplicants to a strong state who find themselves vulnerable to a
reversal in which they are blamed for their own victimization.15 To
highlight some of the most important features of capital victim speech
as a "game of truth," i.e., a relationship between knowledge and
power, the essay turns to a cultural practice of speech that existed in
ancient Greece and was understood as central to its political and legal
system. "Parrhesia" is often translated as "freedom of speech," and
much of the discussion of it in ancient Greek texts sounds quite
similar to the modern constitutional right to freedom of speech that
has been so contested and celebrated in liberal societies since World
War 11.16
12. GARLAND, supra note 11, at 144.
13. See Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI.
L. REV. 361, 405 (1996); Angela P. Harris, The Jurisprudence of Victimhood, 1991 Sup.
Cr. REV. 44, 94; Elizabeth E. Joh, Narrating Pain: The Problem with Victim Impact
Statements, 10 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 17, 30 (2000); Martha Minow, Surviving Victim
Talk, 40 UCLA. L. REV. 1411, 1413 (1993).
14. Bandes, supra note 13, at 397-98; Harris, supra note 13, at 92-93; Joh, supra note
13, at 18.
15. Minow, supra note 13, at 1431.
16. MICHAEL FOUCAULT, FEARLESS SPEECH 50 (Joseph Pearson ed., 2001). Thus,
in Euripides' drama Ion, the title character worries that as a person of uncertain
20041 1381
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Rather than describing speech in general, or even political
speech, parrhesia in ancient Greece described a more specific cultural
practice of speech in which the speaker frankly reveals his personally
known truth at great risk out of a duty of loyalty to another (or to the
public good).17 This sense is better captured by Michel Foucault's
translation of parrhesia into English as "fearless speech."' 8
This Essay argues that parrhesia provides an illuminating model
for what is emerging as an increasingly powerful cultural practice of
speech acts of capital crime victims in contemporary American law
and politics.19 Modern democracies rely on games of truth quite
distinct from those of ancient Athens, but the Illinois clemency
hearings suggest that a game of truth very much like parrhesia is
operating in the political space created by capital punishment.
In arguing that something very much like the ancient Greek
democratic practice of parrhesia is reemerging in the form of capital
crime victim talk, this Essay proceeds in three Parts. Part I describes
the emerging centrality of the victim and criticism of victim speech as
a new form of discourse raised by legal scholars. Part II summarizes
Foucault's account of parrhesia and its role in ancient Greek political
and philosophical life. Part III compares the ancient Greek practice
of parrhesia to our current practices of capital crime victim speech to
help explain the disturbing political effects produced when capital
crime victims speak. The Conclusion draws some implications from
the Greek experience with parrhesia for the emerging power of crime
victims in our current political order.
I. THE RISE OF THE VICTIM
According to sociologists, the status of the victim has undergone
a remarkable transformation in the last quarter century.2 In the
previous "penal-welfare framework" of criminal justice, the victim
parentage, he may be denied freedom of speech in Athens: "If I may do so, I pray my
mother is Athenian, so that through her I may have the rights of speech [parrhesia]. For
when a stranger comes into the city of pure blood, though in name a citizen, his mouth
remains a slave: he has no right of speech." Id. at 50 (quoting Euripides, Ion, in
EURIPIDES III, lines 668-70 (David Grene & Richmond Lattimore eds., Ronald Frederick
Willetts trans., 1958)).
17. FOUCAULT, supra note 16, at 14-18.
18. Id.
19. This Essay leaves to another time the question of whether interesting genealogical
pathways actually connect ancient Greek parrhesia with the place of the capital crime
victim in modern American democracy.
20. See, e.g., GARLAND, supra note 11, at 11 ("Over the last three decades there has
been a remarkable return of the victim to center stage in criminal justice policy.").
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did not have much legal significance in the prosecution or punishment
of criminals1.2  The purposes of punishment focused on the public
interest in reducing crime and even in rehabilitating the offender.22
"The tendency of criminal justice systems in Western democracies has
been to displace the victim, to shut the door on those with the
greatest interest in responding to a crime."' In the early twenty-first
century, with the rehabilitative ideology largely disavowed by
governments in the United States, the victim is emerging both as a
subject of sympathy and a source of legitimacy for the criminal justice
system.24 As David Garland notes: "The new political imperative is
that victims must be protected, their voices must be heard, their
memory honoured, their anger expressed, their fears addressed. '
This valorization of the victim goes beyond the criminal process.
The political order itself now reflects upon the crime victim as
definitive of the governable interests of the larger public.26 Garland
further articulates:
The victim is now, in a certain sense, a much more
representative character, whose experience is taken to be
common and collective, rather than individual and atypical.
Whoever speaks on behalf of victims speaks on behalf of us
all--or so declares the new political wisdom of high crime
societies. Publicized images of actual victims serve as the
personalized, real-life, it-could-be-you metonym for a problem
of security that has become a defining feature of contemporary
culture.
This means that when lawmakers, executives, and administrators
seek to discover the governable interests of the population, it is to
crime victims that they look for that truth.28 This is not only true of
the objectives of the criminal process or its justifications, but it is also
true of the forms of truth producing. Under correctionalism, expert
knowledge of individual offenders was the central expression of how
truth was produced. The victim now stands at the center of how
criminal justice produces truth about crime. "Contemporary penal
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. SARAT, supra note 2, at 34.




28. See JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: THE WAR ON CRIME
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA, 1960-2000, at 13 (forthcoming 2004).
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discourse is (a political projection of) the individual victim and his or
her feelings. "29
If sociologists have been impressed with the dramatic change
that the rise of the victim represents, normative legal scholars have
been far from sanguine about the consequences.3 ° When law invests
meaning in the injuries of the victimized subject, it sets off a chain of
unintended effects. These normative arguments emphasize three
different concerns about victim speech: the effects on the criminal
process; the effects on the subject; and the effects on the broader
political order.
The discussion among legal scholars has been framed largely by
the victim impact evidence controversy set off by the Supreme
Court's 1991 reversal of its four-year-old precedent holding such
evidence inadmissible in capital sentencing proceedings.31 Payne v.
Tennessee32 raised questions about the majority's fealty to the tenuous
structure of guided discretion built up by the Court's capital
jurisprudence since Furman v. Georgia.33 This approach included
various ways of guiding decisionmakers through legislatively
determined aggravating factors and then weighing them against an
almost unlimited range of mitigating considerations arising from the
defendant's life. This method was assumed to result in a narrowing of
the field of criminal defendants exposed to sentences of death, thus
reducing the capriciousness of death sentences. While the Supreme
Court retreated from this model,34 the Court's approval of victim
29. GARLAND, supra note 11, at 144.
30. See generally Bandes, supra note 13 (exploring and arguing against the use of
victim impact statements); Harris, supra note 13 (criticizing the United States Supreme
Court's opinion in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991), as promoting what the author
terms a "jurisprudence of victimhood"); Joh, supra note 13 (exposing problems with the
use of victim impact statements); Minow, supra note 13 (critically analyzing the role of
victim statements in criminal jurisprudence).
31. In Booth v. Maryland, a 5-4 majority held that victim impact testimony was
unconstitutional. 482 U.S. 496, 509 (1987). In Payne v. Tennessee, a different 5-4 majority
upheld the use of such testimony. 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).
32. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
33. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam); see also Bandes, supra note 13, at 395 (arguing
that victim impact statements create emotional reactions that "deflect the jury from its
duty to consider the individual defendant and his moral culpability").
34. The Court's retreat from a strong version of guided discretion became visible by
the end of the 1970s. See Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 Sup. Cr. REv. 305,
305. The problem has been exacerbated by the proliferation of aggravating factors by
legislators who recognize the potency of such factors as ways for law to recognize and
reward whole categories of constituents. See Jonathan Simon & Christina Spaulding,
Tokens of Our Esteem: Aggravating Factors in the Era of Deregulated Death Penalties, in
THE KILLING STATE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN LAW, POLITICS AND CULTURE 89-95
(Austin D. Sarat ed., 1999). The result of judicial loosening of standards and legislative
[Vol. 821384
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impact evidence in Payne seemed to risk a complete break with the
premise that discretion guided by rationality was even desirable and a
return to the view that death penalties belonged to a field of justice
and power beyond rational review. More concretely, critics have
feared that allowing capital victims to speak about their families' pain
directly in front of juries will lead jurors to reject careful weighing in
favor of an undifferentiated quest for vengeance which will find its
meaning in such constitutionally offensive concerns as "the social
position, articulateness, and race of their victims and their victims'
families."35  From this perspective, the dramatic intervention of
capital crime victim testimony changes the penalty phase from a
consideration of the murderer's culpability to a " 'status competition'
between the offender ... and those who were directly or derivatively
injured by the crime."36
Critics have also worried about the consequences for victims
themselves of being legally inscribed in the identity and narratives of
victimization. In taking up law's invitation to speak as a victim,
subjects may find themselves caught up in a "rhetoric of victimization
[that] charts out a limited repertoire of responses" from others.37 The
victim impact statement "legitimizes a particular identity and
narrative. ' 38  They may "disempower, dehumanize, and silence
victims. '39 More generally, drawing on recent political and cultural
theory,4" victim speech critics believe that the victim identity is a
"cramped identity"41 which emphasizes the passivity of the victim and
links him to "images associated with (white) middle-class values (e.g.,
nuclear families, celebrations of holidays), Christianity, and
patriotism, as well as emotional reactions associated with victimhood
such as rage, helplessness, and fear."4 2
The law grants the victim power in the capital sentencing
proliferation of aggravators is that the present system is unlikely to effectuate much
narrowing.
35. Bandes, supra note 13, at 397-98; see also Harris, supra note 13, at 92-95; Joh,
supra note 13, at 18.
36. ZIMRING, supra note 2, at 55.
37. Minow, supra note 13, at 1413.
38. Joh, supra note 13, at 30.
39. Bandes, supra note 13, at 405.
40. For a discussion on political and cultural theory, see generally WENDY BROWN,
STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE MODERNITY (1995); KRISTIN
BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF VICTIMS
(1988); WENDY KAMINER, I'M DYSFUNCTIONAL, YOU'RE DYSFUNCTIONAL: THE
RECOVERY MOVEMENT AND OTHER SELF-HELP FASHIONS (1992).
41. Minow, supra note 13, at 1432.
42. Joh, supra note 13, at 27.
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process, but at a potentially great cost. First, the subject may become
invested in her own emotional injuries, injuries actually reinforced by
the legal practices of testimony. 3 Second, the growing body of
governmental expertise focused on helping victims can "rebound" on
victims by placing responsibility on the victim to change his life in
order to reduce opportunities for future victimization." Having
helped legitimize a role for government as an authoritarian crime
fighter, victim speech may oblige victims to accept a truncated set of
freedoms in exchange for the promise of security.
Perhaps the gravest concerns held by normative critics of victim
speech have to do with the effects such speech has on the broader
political order and the role of law in it. From this perspective, victim
speech provides far more than mere "information" to the legal
process,45 but instead constitutes a powerful discourse that resituates
the relationship among citizens and between citizens and the state.
One feature of this new and disturbing discourse is its emphasis on
subjective experience and emotions as forms of truth that can be
directly introduced into legal and political consideration. 6 With this
subjectivity, however, comes the risk of incommensurability. How
are we to choose among multiple claims of victimization and injury?
Moreover, this subjective voice of injury tends to level all forms of
injury, finding in the experience of pain a common source of authority
that does not readily permit a moral hierarchy. Instead it divides the
world into victims and victimizers, setting off complex strategic
maneuvers by various parties to secure the identity of victim. 7
The emphasis on vengeance also raises broader problems for the
political order. As Susan Bandes explains it, the victim impact
statement "disinter[s] a primitive version of privatized justice, one
that not only pits the defendant against the victim's family, but
revives the notion that different victims call for different levels of
compensation."'  Society's need for punishment, including the death
penalty, as a way to achieve justice as an end in itself, and apart from
any crime suppressive effects of punishment, has long been
43. Id. at 30.
44. Minow, supra note 13, at 1416-17.
45. Joh points out that victim impact statements are not " 'simply another form or
method of informing the sentencing authority' but rather the inscription and legitimization
of a cultural practice which has significantly altered the capital sentencing scheme, as well
as criminal sanctions generally." Joh, supra note 13, at 18 (quoting Payne v. Tennessee,
501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991)).
46. Minow, supra note 13, at 1416.
47. Id. at 1430.
48. Bandes, supra note 13, at 407.
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recognized in modern jurisprudence under the name of retribution.49
Justice Potter Stewart recognized the legitimacy of this view, even in
modern society, in his concurring opinion in Furman:
The instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and
channeling that instinct in the administration of criminal justice
serves an important purpose in promoting the stability of a
society governed by law. When people begin to believe that
organized society is unwilling or unable to impose upon
criminal offenders the punishment they "deserve," then there
are sown the seeds of anarchy of self-help, vigilante justice, and
lynch law.5°
The rise of capital crime victim speech is less about exacting
retribution in a moral theory sense than it is about providing a vehicle
for expressing collective outrage and desire for vengeance. 1 This
represents a profound disruption of the legal and political equality of
the individual, one with implications for interpersonal as well as
governmental relations.
There are, to be sure, positive normative arguments that the rise
of victims in the criminal process and the proliferation of victim
speech are necessary developments that help address the historic
indifference of the legal system toward victims. Victim participation
also secures a greater measure of political support for victims by
making politicians more accountable. 2 Critics of victim impact
49. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN EXPOSITION OF THE
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE AS THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT 195 (W.
Hastie trans., 1887) (1796). Kant is perhaps best known for his expression of this view of
retribution:
The Penal Law is a Categorical Imperative; and woe to him who creeps through
the serpent-windings of Utilitarianism to discover some advantage that may
discharge him from the Justice of Punishment, or even from the due measure of
it .... What, then, is to be said of such a proposal as to keep a Criminal alive
who has been condemned to death, on his being given to understand that if he
agreed to certain dangerous experiments being performed upon him, he would
be allowed to survive.... It is argued that Physicians might thus obtain new
information that would be of value to the Commonweal. But ... Justice would
cease to be Justice, if it were bartered away for any consideration whatever.
Id. at 195-96.
50. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1971) (per curiam) (Stewart, J.,
concurring). In his dissenting opinion, Justice Powell observed that " '[retribution is no
longer the dominant objective of the criminal law.' " Id. at 452 (Powell, J., dissenting)
(quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949)). However, Chief Justice Burger
noted in his dissent that "the Court has consistently assumed that retribution is a
legitimate dimension of the punishment of crimes." Id. at 394-95 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
51. Bandes, supra note 13, at 396-98.
52. PAUL GEWIRTZ, VICTIMS AND VOYEURS: TwO NARRATIVE PROBLEMS AT THE
2004] 1387
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statements may exaggerate the vulnerability of juries and the legal
system more generally to the seductions of emotion and subjectivity. 3
Rather than evaluating these competing arguments, the rest of this
Essay seeks to explore an important insight of the critics that victim
speech is not just more information but rather, as Elizabeth Joh puts
it, "a cultural practice," 4 or discourse, with the potential to
significantly alter the legal and political order. In the next two Parts,
this Essay seeks to expand upon this discussion by analogizing
contemporary victim speech to the ancient Greek speech practice of
parrhesia.
II. THE ANCIENT GREEK PRACTICE OF PARRHESIA
A. Frankness
Much of the work of Michel Foucault, the late philosopher, can
be read as a series of studies into the very different practices of truth
that fed into the contemporary western tradition of truth. In a series
of lectures presented at Berkeley in the fall of 1983, Foucault turned
to the topic of parrhesia, a word used in Ancient Greek texts to
describe a special kind of speech in which a speaker presents to the
audience a complete account of a truth known to the speaker through
his own experience and insight and independent of any other kind of
corroborating evidence.55 According to Foucault, the concept of
parrhesia and its emergence as a problem for philosophy in the fifth
century B.C. marked a permanent fissure between two different kinds
of truth projects.56 One, which he calls an "analytics of truth" is
"concerned with determining how to ensure that a statement is
true."57 The other, which grew from parrhesia, is concerned with the
question of "[w]hat is the importance for the individual and for the
society of telling the truth, of knowing the truth, of having people
who tell the truth, as well as knowing how to recognize the truth. 58
This second pathway that grows from parrhesia provides the roots of
the "critical" tradition in the West.
CRIMINAL TRIAL, LAW'S STORIES 135 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996).
53. Id.
54. Joh, supra note 13, at 18.
55. Thomas Schwarz, Ancient Frankness: Foucault's Aesthetics of Existence and the
Question of Free Speech, 9 PRETEXTS: LITERARY AND CULTURAL STUDIES 125, 129
(2000).
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The key to parrhesia is frankness. Parrhesia creates a direct
circuit between the inner experience of the speaker and the judgment
of the listener.59 The speaker, or parrhesiastes, undertakes to allow
the completeness of an inner experience to come forward through
speech and enter directly into the feelings and thoughts of the other.
6
0
Frankness is often translated as honesty, but it goes beyond that in at
least two directions. Frankness implies completeness. Frank speech
is speech that reflects the complete knowledge of the speaker on the
topic. The parrhesiastes is someone who says everything he has in
mind: he does not hide anything, but opens his heart and mind
completely to other people through his discourse.6'
Frankness also references the internal origins of the knowledge
communicated in speech. What makes speech frank is precisely that
it reveals as transparently as possible exactly to what the speaker has
special access-her own beliefs.62  In this sense parrhesia was
distinguished from "rhetoric," the process by which a speaker tries to
persuade someone through the deployment of skillful
argumentation.6 3  In contrast the parrhesiastes operates through
frankness.
According to Foucault, the political effectiveness of this kind of
speech is the inverse of the great risk it created for the frank speaker.
If the sovereign was affronted by the impertinence of the
parrhesiastes, he might retaliate, but this danger is precisely what
validated the truth of the speech, which would seem contrary to self-
interest.64 In another set of texts, parrhesia appears as a method of
education or pedagogy. It is Socrates as a teacher and model who is
the parrhesiastes, now confronting not the King, but the self of the
student or disciple with questions exposing their lack of self-
knowledge. It is through the practice of parrhesia in this sense that
the mature citizen enters into the full power of freedom through a
knowledge-based mastery of the self.65
59. Id. at 12.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. ("[T]he parrhesiastes acts on other people's minds by showing them as directly
as possible what he actually believes.").
63. Id.
64. See id. at 15-17 (noting that a philosopher who "speaks the truth" to a tyrant takes
a risk that the tyrant may kill him).
65. Id. at 23-24.
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B. Truth
In this sense parrhesia is a distinct mode of producing truth. This
method is not tied to or even engaged with empirical observation or
logical deduction but rather arises directly from the internal access of
the speaker to her own beliefs.66 This raises profound problems of
commensurability. What do we do when two or more speakers
produce parrhesiastic truths that are irreconcilable with each other?
The problem of validation was addressed for the ancient Greeks by
the social and moral stature reflected in the very act of parrhesia.6 v
Unlike the game of truth that has dominated the official
epistemologies of Western societies since Descartes' exploration of
our mental experiment, parrhesiastic truth emerges not in thinking,
but in cultural practices of speaking. Unlike the Cartesian
interrogator of mental states whose stance is one of self-doubt, the
parrhesiastic speaker manifests pure confidence in the knowledge of
the truth which lies wholly within him.68
C. Danger
Confidence is integral to another feature of parrhesia. There is a
degree of risk involved in the completeness and frankness of
parrhesia. The speech act itself, which does the work of parrhesia,
must be precisely that which exposes the speaker to risk. "The
parrhesiastes says something which is dangerous to himself and thus
involves a risk."'69 This can work in two ways. First, the reprocessing
of the traumatic experiences that underlie parrhesiastic truth may do
damage to the speaker through his own circuits of memory and
emotion.7" Second, the truth spoken may offend powerful members
of the audience who may seek to retaliate. "[I]n parrhesia the danger
always comes from the fact that the said truth is capable of hurting or
angering the interlocutor."71  In both senses, parrhesiastic speech is
66. Id. at 14.
67. Id. at 14-15.
68. Id. at 14. Interestingly, Foucault sees this contrast as so dramatic that "[i]t appears
that, parrhesia, in this Greek sense, can no longer occur in our modern epistemological
framework." Id. This may suggest Foucault would have been skeptical about the central
argument of this Essay, that the speech of crime victims is a new birth of parrhesia. It may
also suggest, however, that the return of something like the parrhesiastic game of truth
reflects a broad challenge to that modern epistemological framework.
69. Id. at 15-17.
70. Parrhesia, then, is linked to courage in the face of danger: it demands the courage
to speak the truth in spite of some danger. And "in its extreme form, telling the truth
takes place in the 'game' of life or death." Id. at 16.
71. Id. at 17.
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fearless speech because it knowingly embraces risk. Danger can also
come from those who listen to the parrhesia. A striking example of
this reckless and provocative aspect of parrhesia is recounted in
writings of Dio Chrysostom of Prusa, a provincial Roman noble of the
late first century, who became a liberal political activist and to some
extent a philosophical follower of the cynic tradition. Dio describes
the relationship of Diogenes, the philosopher who originated the
cynic tradition, and Alexander, the King of Greece, who accepted the
philosopher as a counselor and teacher. This parrhesiastic contract
was put to a severe test by Diogenes's famously insulting style:
[Diogenese] went on to tell the king that he did not even
possess the badge of royalty .... "And what badge is that?"
said Alexander. "It is the badge of the bees," he replied, "that
the king wears. Have you not heard that there is a king among
the bees, made so by nature, who does not hold office by virtue
of what you people who trace your descent from Heracles call
inheritance?" "What is this badge?" inquired Alexander.
"Have you not heard farmers say," asked the other, "that this is
the only bee that has no sting, since he requires no weapon
against anyone? For no other bee will challenge his right to be
king or fight him when he has this badge. I have an idea,
however that you not only go about fully armed but even sleep
that way. Do you know," he continued, "that it is a sign of fear
in a man for him to carry arms? And no man who is afraid
would ever have a chance to become king any more than a slave
would."72
According to Dio, these remarks so tested Alexander that he
prepared to hurl a spear at Diogenes.73 Diogenes's fearlessness in
speaking so frankly epitomized the parrhesiastic role a philosopher
could play in guiding a Greek sovereign. Likewise, Alexander's
forbearance in accepting Diogenes's criticism without retribution
marked him as a virtuous ruler rather than a tyrant.74
D. Criticism
What makes parrhesia dangerous, of course, is that it is likely to
be critical. It is not parrhesia to praise the sovereign or flatter one's
friends, even if one believes what one says. Nor is it parrhesia to
72. Id. at 127-28 (quoting DiO CHRYSOSTOM, THE FOURTH DISCOURSE ON
KINGSHIP, 61-64 (J.W. Cohoon trans., Loeb Classical Library (1971)).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 23.
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testify against oneself in a criminal trial.75 The danger in parrhesia
must come from another, the interlocutor, who is in a position to hurt
the speaker.
7 6
In democratic societies, parrhesia involves speaking truth to an
assembly (or an elected executive), rather than to the sovereign. Yet
even in democratic parrhesia, the speaker must have sufficient status,
i.e, be at least a citizen. "[I]n fact, one must be one of the best among
the citizens, possessing those specific personal, moral, and social
qualities which grant one the privilege to speak."77  Danger was
present in democratic parrhesia as well as monarchical. The
sovereign, if sufficiently affronted by parrhesia, could order its author
punished. It was a well-known feature of Greek democracy that the
majority, if offended by the truths spoken by a speaker, could be
exiled.78
E. Duty
"[I]n parrhesia, telling the truth is regarded as a duty."7 9 But if
parrhesia is in some sense not a matter of personal choice, neither is it
a general obligation imposed on the general citizenry and enforced by
something like criminal law.80 Instead it emerges from the self-
recognized obligation to speak when to do so is required by one's
relationship to the other. A typical example from the ancient Greek
texts surveyed by Foucault would be the duty of one friend to another
to speak the parrhesiastic truth if he believed the latter was embarked
on an error of judgment likely to produce a substantial moral wrong
or great misfortune.81 Likewise, a citizen who observed her polity
entering a course of wrongdoing might decide that she was obliged to
undertake an act of parrhesia. In both examples there is real danger
that the parrhesiastic act will result in offending a friend or a
sovereign.
Not only is the motivation of parrhesia grounded in duty, but also
ideally the parrhesiastic truth should itself arise from the dutifulness
of the speaker.82 A strong example of parrhesia grounded in duty
75. Id. at 17.
76. Id. at 17.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 19.
80. Indeed, to the extent that speech was forced by the coercion of the state (or any
other actor), it was not parrhesia. Confession to a criminal act could constitute a




CAPITAL CRIME VICTIM SPEECH
comes in Euripides' play Orestes,83 in which a positively portrayed
speaker argues that Orestes should not only be spared execution for
murdering his mother and her husband, but honored for avenging his
father. This speaker is described by Euripides as an autourgos,
essentially a small landowner who worked his own lands with the help
of family members or a few slaves.84 The autuorgos were much
celebrated by Greek thinkers for their excellence in protecting the
state as soldiers and citizen-counselors.85 Their reputation as soldiers
arose from their natural interest in protecting the countryside from
aggressive raiders.86 Their reputation as speakers was traced to their
role as self-governing landowners who must rule over servants and
family members in a context of subsistence.87 "[S]uch landowners are
used to giving orders to their servants, and making decisions about
what must be done in various circumstances.... Hence when they do
speak [publicly], they do not use [clamor or uproar, i.e., negative
parrhesia]; but what they say is important, reasonable, and constitutes
good advice."88 Thus, those who spoke not only out of a sense of
duty, but out of an experience or knowledge which is itself produced
by the pursuit of duty (like that of a soldier or one responsible for the
well being of the household), had special credibility in the ancient
Greek order.8 9
F. Parrhesia and Athenian Politics
Parrhesia was an integral part of the constitution of Athenian
democracy. Like freedom of speech in modern constitutions,
parrhesia was, as a practice, accorded a privileged role in producing
the effects of truth essential to the operation of a self-governing
people to govern themselves.9" Athenian democracy was defined very
explicitly as a constitution in which people enjoyed demokratia
isegoria (the equal right of speech), isonomia (the equal participation
of all citizens in the exercise of power), and parrhesia.91
Unlike the situations in which issues of freedom of speech often
arise today, parrhesia was overwhelmingly a matter of direct personal
83. Euripides, Orestes, in ORESTES AND OTHER PLAYS 332-33 (Philip Vellacott
trans., Betty Radice et al. eds., Penguin Books 1972).
84. Id. at 333.
85. FOUCAULT, supra note 16, at 68.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 69.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 68.
90. Id. at 22.
91. Id.
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interaction rather than publication or broadcast.92 Parrhesia took
place in the public space of political life, with both interlocutors
present and ready to respond.93
After the rise of the Hellenistic monarchies, the place and
function of parrhesia shifted; but, it remained central to making
power accountable:
In the monarchic constitution of the state, it is the advisor's
duty to use parrhesia to help the king with his decisions, and to
prevent him from abusing his power. Parrhesia is necessary and
useful both for the king and for the people under his rule.... A
good king accepts everything that a genuine parrhesiastes tells
him, even if it turns out to be unpleasant for him to hear
criticisms of his decisions. A sovereign shows himself to be a
tyrant if he disregards his honest advisors, or punishes them for
what they have said.94
In both ancient democracy and monarchy, specific acts of
parrhesia could fail and cause damage to the polity. Greek texts
surveyed by Foucault also contain examples and references to
parrhesia as a bad or dangerous practice.9" Monarchs could break the
parrhesiastic promise and seek to punish those who have offended
them.96 Likewise, those with specific criticisms could refuse to risk
frank speech. In democracy, "negative parrhesia" might have taken
the form of "ignorant outspokenness" 97 by those poorly informed to
guide the polity. Because of such failures, parrhesia existed both as
functional practice and problem for the ancients. "One of the
problems which the parrhesiastic character must resolve, then, is how
to distinguish that which must be said from that which should be kept
silent. For not everyone can draw such a distinction." 98 The political
function of parrhesia and its operation as a technique of personal
enlightenment were intertwined in ancient Greece. The suitability of




94. Id. at 22-23.
95. Id. at 23.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 73. This negative use of parrhesia appears in Euripides' account of the
public trial of Orestes. In the play, Euripides describes a speaker who advocates Orestes's
death as having "a mouth like a running spring, a giant in impudence ... putting his
confidence in bluster and ignorant outspokenness." Id. at 58 (quoting Euripides, supra
note 83, at 332).
98. Id. at 64.
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G. The Care of the Self
By the middle of the fourth century B.C., in the writings of Plato
and Aristotle, parrhesia had become primarily a problem of the
speaker's personal characteristics rather than her status.99  The
question was no longer who had a right to parrhesia, but rather a
question of the capacities of the speaker, i.e., his moral integrity and
insight." Here the parrhesiastes is one who speaks truth to other
individuals with the purpose of guiding them toward a more virtuous
or healthy life. In this sense it is a part of a larger Greek tradition of
techniques for the "care of the self." '' Socrates is perhaps the most
famous example in this Athenian tradition." His career included
moments of classic Athenian political parrhesia, but also revealed him
as a leading proponent of parrhesia in the service of spiritual
guidance. 1°3 He offered his frank opinion of the reasoning of his
students, including many who stood far above him in social
position. 1°4
H. Problematization of Parrhesia
Parrhesia then is much more than a legal right, it is a complex
arrangement of truth and power on which people act on each other
and on their own relationships to other people and whole political
communities. Foucault's brief study of parrhesia was expressly
motivated less by an interest in the political and sociological function
of parrhesia than by an interest in the controversies stirred in ancient
Greek thought around this special practice of truth-telling.
According to Foucault, questions like these were raised:
Who is able to tell the truth? What are the moral, the ethical,
and the spiritual conditions which entitle someone to present
himself as, and to be considered as, a truth-teller? About what
topics is it important to tell the truth? ... What are the
consequences of telling the truth? What are the anticipated
positive effects for the city, for the city's rulers, for the
individual?, etc. And finally: What is the relation between the
99. Id. at 85-87.
100. See id. at 85-86.
101. See generally MICHAEL FOUCAULT, THE CARE OF SELF (Robert Hurley trans.,
Pantheon Books 1986) (1984) (discussing the larger tradition of techniques for "care of
self").
102. Socrates lived between 470 B.C. and 399 B.C. See 20 ENCYCLOPAEDIA
BRITTANICA 819 (15th ed. 2002).
103. FOUCAULT, supra note 16, at 101.
104. Id.
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activity of truth-telling and the exercise of power? 1°5
These questions, raised around the practice of parrhesia by
ancient Greek drama and philosophy, become, in Foucault's view, the
source in Western societies of a critical tradition or critical attitude
that has developed in Western philosophy, independent of the
dominant concern with the validity of the process of reasoning.
Foucault turned to the plays of Euripides for a number of
examples of parrhesiastic practice. Here he finds confirmation of its
significance as a marker of social status, since only those with certain
standing gain access to parrhesia. Foucault finds evidence in drama,
as well as philosophical writing, for a crisis of parrhesia as its defects
under both democratic and monarchical politics became more visible,
and as it became more associated with the spiritual work of educating
the subject in the care of the self.
Euripides' play Ion'016 celebrates parrhesia as a form of truth
telling and thematizes its relationship to other forms of truth
operating in the ancient world. The truth telling in Ion involves a
crime that quite literally dwells at the center of religious truth in
ancient Greek society, the Delphic oracle, and was committed by the
god responsible for powering the oracle, Apollo. °7 Years before the
time depicted in the play, Apollo raped a young noble woman,
Creusa, who then gave birth to the title character Ion.108 Rather than
admit his crime, Apollo hides it by taking Ion away and installing him
as a servant at Delphi, where he serves to guide visitors seeking to
place questions before the Oracle. 10 9 In the course of the play, Creusa
and her husband, Xuthus, the reigning sovereigns of Athens, come to
Delphi to inquire of the god Apollo whether they will succeed in their
efforts to have a child, who will be an heir to the throne."0 At Delphi
they meet Ion, but do not apprehend that he is the offspring of
Creusa. in As Apollo's servant, he directs them in for their meeting
with the Oracle." 2
105. Id. at 169-70.
106. Euripides, Ion, in EURIPIDES III (David Grene & Richmond Lattimore eds.,
Ronald Frederick Willetts trans., 1958).
107. 2 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 102, at 120.
108. FOUCAULT, supra note 16, at 39.
109. Id. at 40.
110. Euripides, supra note 106, at 187-88. This plotline is complicated by the fact that
Xuthus, as a foreigner, is in some tension with the Athenian tradition of native Kings.
FOUCAULT, supra note 16, at 40. A clear and legitimate successor would shore up concern
about this anomaly. Id.
111. Euripides, supra note 106, at 187-88.
112. Id.
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Euripides, according to Foucault, uses the dramatic wrongness of
the rape to contrast the truth making process of the Delphic oracle's
interpretable utterances with that of parrhesia, which operates
directly upon the listener. 113 Throughout the play Apollo, who never
appears, refuses to admit the truth of what he has done to Creusa.
Instead, the Oracle is used to spread misinformation and lies aimed at
concealing Apollo's crime.114 In contrast, Ion and Creusa use
parrhesia to advance political reform, to expose Apollo's guilt for a
terrible crime, and with the aid of further twists in the plot, to bring
forth the truth of the central characters' relationship to each other.'15
The central parrhesiastic act in the play is Ion's speech, delivered
to his sudden benefactor, Xuthus, Creusa's husband, who has been
mislead by Apollo into believing that Ion is his son from a brief
liaison years earlier." 6 Xuthus is the King of Athens as a result of his
marriage to Creusa. Deceived by the Oracle into believing that Ion is
his son, Xuthus offers to bring him back to Athens and provide for
him. 17 Ion responds rather strangely to this generous offer, launching
into an extended polemic about Athenian politics, which is expressly
motivated by worries that he will not be able to acquire the right of
parrhesia unless he can prove that he was born of an Athenian. 18 He
goes on to lament to Xuthus the pathologies of both democracy, in
which envy and resentment define the relations between people, and
a monarchy, in which the potential for lethal animus against the
sovereign is always possible." 9 These speeches, delivered to the King
himself, constitute exemplary acts of political parrhesia.2 °
A second act of parrhesia involves Creusa's angry speech to
Apollo himself in which she criticizes and mocks Apollo for his cruel
act of rape and his continuing concealment of the truth of her
offspring. 2 ' Speaking outside the locked doors of the Oracle and
angered further by the fact that Apollo has favored her husband with
the discovery of his long lost son (just what she wants), Creusa
delivers a tirade against the god, berating him for the cruelty of his
113. See FOUCAULT, supra note 16, at 40-44.
114. See, e.g., id. at 45 (describing one instance of Apollo's "obscure and ambiguous"
pronouncements through the Oracle).
115. Id. at 46-54.
116. Id. at 44-52 (describing various aspects of Ion's speech).
117. Id. at 48.
118. Id. at 50.
119. Id. at 48-49.
120. Id. at 47-52. Foucault suggests that this seems to be the dramatic function of the
speeches which have little relationship to the plot. Id.
121. Id. at 53-54.
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treatment.
Both speeches seem deliberately to juxtapose parrhesia with the
system of oracular truth in which Apollo functions as the central god,
communicating truth through the interpreted shrieking of the
Oracle. 2 3 As a way of linking governing with truth, Ion depicts
parrhesia for all its faults as a far more reliable instrument than the
Delphic oracle.
While Euripides seems to celebrate the parrhesia as a successful
practice of truth telling in Ion, it is portrayed much more
problematically in a series of plays Euripides produced in the last
years of his life. Once again, parrhesia is deployed in a context of the
criminal behavior of the powerful. In Ion, the powerful criminal is
the god Apollo; in Electra,'2 4 it is Clytemnestra, a Queen who has
murdered her husband, Agamemnon, upon his return from the
Trojan wars.12 She then rules Athens with her adulterous lover, who
has become her husband and King.126 In Electra, the title character,
along with her brother Orestes, kills her mother Clytemnestra and
her husband in vengeance for their conspiracy against and murder of
their father.127 In a key scene of the drama just before the final
execution of vengeance, Clytemnestra confesses to Electra that she
has in fact killed her husband, Agamemnon, and explains that her act
was in fact a vengeance against her husband for his sacrifice of
Iphigenia. 28 Clytemnestra then explicitly invites Electra to perform
parrhesia in order to test Clytemnestra's assertion that she was
justified in killing Agamemnon. 129 Electra takes up what Foucault
describes as a parrhesiastic contract, only to betray it by killing the
object of that parrhesia, her mother and Queen. 3° In Electra,
parrhesia seems troubling and without redemption, perhaps because
it operates in a landscape defined by horrendous crimes and the deep
felt need for vengeance. Whereas the normal operation of parrhesia
in a monarchy is to create a space where speakers may speak truth to
122. Id. at 52-54.
123. In the Delphic ritual, a prophetess called Pythia delivered Apollo's message
through ecstatic expressions that were then interpreted by the priests of the temple. See 8
ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 102, at 975.
124. Euripides, Electra, in MEDEA AND OTHER PLAYS 105 (Philip Vellacott trans.,
Penguin Books 1963).
125. FOUCAULT, supra note 16, at 32.
126. Id. at 33.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 34.
129. Id.
130. Recall that the sovereign is perceived as the interlocutor for parrhesia to work.
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the sovereign without fear of punishment, it is deployed in Electra as
a prelude to the pursuit of vengeance against a sovereign.
The theme of parrhesia is raised even more problematically in
Euripedes final play, Orestes, which continues the familial and
political story described in Electra."' In Orestes, the title character
and his sister, Electra, are on trial for their murder of Clytemnestra
and her husband. 13 Here parrhesia is once again being used in the
context of criminal justice, but this time in the imagined speeches of
an Athenian jury deciding the fates of the siblings.133 Taking
advantage of the traditional Athenian procedure for criminal trials
that allows any citizen to address the court, Euripides presents a
variety of mythological and historical figures exercising parrhesia to
take a stand on the fate of the pair. But Euripides portrays both
foolish and wise counsel being expressed in this classic form of
parrhesia. For Euripides, neither the frankness of speech, nor its
fearlessness, can assure its value to the assembly. Those who are
privileged to speak include those who do have special qualities of
insight and those who do not, and how to distinguish among them is a
problem.
In Foucault's view, the shift in Euripides' attitude toward
parrhesia between Ion and Orestes captured a shift in the political
context and meaning of parrhesia brought on by the Peloponnesian
wars."3 If the play Ion celebrated parrhesia and its advantages over
the divine system of truth associated with the Delphic oracle, Orestes
problematizes parrhesia, revealing a host of problems about the uses
made of parrhesia in a democracy. 35 This was a problem haunting
Athenian society in the midst of its long and controversial war with
Sparta. This war split the major political parties; the democratic party
of merchants and traders supported the war, and the conservative
party of aristocratic landowners opposed the war.136 The contrast
between foolish and wise uses of parrhesia in Orestes corresponds,
according to Foucault, to the split between the leading political
parties in Athens.'37 The leader of the democratic party, Cleophon, a
foreigner naturalized as an Athenian citizen and famous for his
rhetorical abilities, exemplified for Euripides the danger of parrhesia
131. Euripides, supra note 83, at 301-02.
132. Id. at 330-34.
133. Id.
134. FOUCAULT, supra note 16, at 71-72.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 70.
137. Id.
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as speech that claimed the status of inner truth but was actually
rhetorical and manipulative. 13 8  The leader of the aristocratically-
leaning conservative party, Theramenes, exemplified the good
parrhesiastic speaker who expresses inner truths derived from his own
experience fulfilling his duties and obligations.139
Euripides captured the transformation of parrhesia from a clear
institutional right to a moral quality present in some, but not all,
citizens and the cultivation of which became the task of philosophical
training. This problematization emerged in disputes around two
fundamental questions. First, who is entitled to speak the truth, now
not according to formal status, but according to ability? 14° Second,
how is one to prepare to speak the truth?' The risk taking of truth
speaking no longer suffices to assure its validity. The problem of how
to cultivate a capacity to speak the truth becomes a subject of
philosophical and spiritual expertise.
III. ANCIENT PARRHESIA AND VICTIM SPEECH IN CONTEMPORARY
LAW & SOCIETY
Freedom of speech plays a critical role in contemporary
democracy, but fearless speech does not. 42 The legal doctrine of
freedom of speech protects parrhesiastic speech of the sort celebrated
in the ancient Greek texts discussed above, but places no special
significance on parrhesia as such.'43 The unique features of parrhesia
as a type of speech act have no special role in legal or political
accounts of freedom of speech in contemporary American
democracy.1" The person who steps forward in public to condemn
the corruption of leaders or practices (or whole communities) has
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 72.
141. Id. at 72-73.
142. See generally THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
(1970) (discussing the status of free speech and its corresponding restraints in America
today); ALEXANDER MEIKELJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1965) (emphasizing the importance of free speech in America
to the vital goal of self-government).
143. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 849-56 (2d ed. 1988).
Actually, the existence of doctrines like "fighting words" and "clear and present danger,"
which permit repression of speech that is very likely to lead to violence, means that
provocative parrhesiastic speech acts are somewhat less protected by First Amendment
freedom of speech than speech with similar content but delivered with less "frankness."
Id.; see also Judy Sarasohn, Resurrecting 'Harry' and 'Louise' Stirs Flap, WASH. POST,
Apr. 25, 2002, at A27.
144. This is one reason to prefer Foucault's translation of parrhesia into English as
"fearless speech" to the more conventional translation of "free speech."
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often been celebrated in the popular culture of American
democracy, 145 but seems to play little role in the political functions of
speech today. Instead, a dominant role is accorded to mass media,
through print and broadcast channels, and in the form of skillfully
produced political advertising. Whatever one" makes of such political
advertisements, they are not parrhesiastic in any sense that would
have been recognizable to the ancient Greeks. For one thing, they
typically do not involve real individuals. The speakers who might
appear to be making a parrhesiastic act by condemning a particular
policy supported by powerful leaders or interests, or criticizing
political candidates, are simply actors playing fictional characters
(like Harry and Louise, the celebrated "characters" whose fictional
dialogs on behalf of health insurance reform organization sponsored
by the health insurance industry, were widely credited with helping to
scuttle President Clinton's plans for health insurance reform in the
early 1990s). But even if actual individuals appear in such
advertisements, the nature of the modern liberal political order has
eliminated the crucial elements of duty and risk in ancient parrhesia.
Parrhesia is not, however, wholly absent from contemporary
political life. The western tradition of critical parrhesiastic speech by
intellectuals, a recognizable genealogy that stretches from Socrates
through Emile Zola146 to Daniel Ellsberg,'147 remains alive today but
only episodically. It plays little role in the active practice of
governmental power. A kind of "simulacra"1 of parrhesia exists in
modern television journalism where celebrity reporters compete to
confront politicians with questions about scandals in hopes of eliciting
fresh denials or explanations. It should be clear from the preceding
discussions why this is not parrhesia. First, it lacks a basis in the
internal "truth" of the speaker, amounting to little more than a
recirculation of existing charges. Second, although it may appear
brave to confront a politician, or even an elected leader, with
145. See MEET JOHN DOE (Warner Bros. 1941); MR. SMITH GOES TO WASHINGTON
(Columbia Classics 1939); STATE OF THE UNION (MGM Pictures 1948).
146. Zola was a Parisian journalist who was condemned by the French government for
misconduct in the prosecution of Corporal Alfred Dreyfus. See ALAN SCHOM, EMILE
ZOLA: A BOURGEOIS REBEL 161-90 (1987).
147. Ellsberg was a Defense Department system's analyst who was persecuted by
President Richard Nixon after leaking a copy of the Pentagon's secret study of the
Vietnam War to the media. See TOM WELLS, WILDMAN: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF DAN
ELLSBERG 459-503 (2001).
148. See generally JEAN BAUDRILLARD, SIMULACRA AND SIMULATION (Sheila Faria
Glaser trans., 1994) (1981) (coining the term to describe the emergence in post-modern
society of subjects and objects that appear to be real because of their intense media
presentation, but which are anchored in myth rather than reality).
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scandalous charges, modern reporters face little real danger from
their interlocutors and are likely to be rewarded by their colleagues
and employers.
One of the few places we find an active and politically important
cultural practice that resembles parrhesia is in the speech of crime
victims, especially capital crime victims. Whether in victim impact
statements, political advertising, or in the special agora-like forum of
the Illinois clemency hearings, capital crime victims engage in fearless
speech, in which an inner truth of victimization, is produced in public,
at some risk to the speaker, and with life or death consequences. All
three modes of ancient parrhesia operate in the speech of
contemporary crime victims.
This Essay identifies three distinct practices that have emerged in
which capital crime victims produce truth in a parrhesiastic manner:
the victim impact statement; the political advertisement; and the
clemency hearing. These practices differ in their legal status as well
as in their fit with the model of ancient Greek parrhesia. Victim
impact statements involve formal testimony by capital crime victims
in penalty phase trials held to determine whether defendants
convicted of capital crimes (essentially murder) should suffer the
death penalty or another alternative (usually life in prison with
various restrictions on parole). Like Creusa in Euripides' Ion, the
victim impact testimony of a capital crime victim can make visible and
publicize injuries left hidden by the modes of knowledge at work in
the official finding of criminal guilt. For example, the father of
murder victim Megan Kanka told the jury considering whether to
sentence her killer to death: "The only peace we have as parents are
the moments during sleep when we don't have to deal with the harsh
reality of our everyday lives.' 1 49 In doing so, the capital crime victim
undertakes real risks. There is the risk that he will experience trauma
in having to revisit the crime and its effects. There is the risk that a
capital sentencing jury will reject their truth. There is a duty to the
loved one to seek for her the maximum form of whatever "justice"
the legal system defines as available.
Capital crime victims, especially parents of murdered children,
have emerged as highly effective champions of harsher criminal
laws.150 Crime victims have also emerged as potent critics of political
149. Joh, supra note 13, at 34.
150. Nicholas Riccardi, Prosecutors Seek Fewer 3rd Strikes, L.A. TIMES, May 27, 2003,
at B1 (discussing views of Mike Reynolds). In California, the adoption of the nation's
most severe version of "three-strikes" legislation, was championed first by Mike Reynolds,
a Fresno salesman whose daughter was murdered. Id.
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leaders seen as failing to protect citizens from violent crime or to seek
adequate punishment after the fact. One of the most widely discussed
images of contemporary presidential politics occurred in the 1988
presidential campaign when supporters of Vice President George H.
W. Bush ran a commercial against his Democratic opponent,
Governor Michael Dukakis of Massachusetts. The advertisement
featured victims of violent rapes and kidnappings that were
committed by a convicted murderer on furlough from a
Massachusetts prison where he had been serving time for murder.
151
The program had not been originated by the Dukakis administration,
but the prisoner, Willie Horton, was released during the Dukakis
administration's tenure. 52 The victims bitterly criticized Governor
Dukakis for exposing them to such violence. The crimes, while not
involving the issue of the death penalty itself, which was not available
in Massachusetts either before or after, clearly involved capital
offenses.'53 The depiction of the Governor being criticized by victims
helped illuminate one of the central policy differences the Bush
campaign was seeking to draw, i.e., its willingness to be much harsher
with convicted criminals.
154
In ancient Greece, parrhesia also functioned as a source of
pedagogic instruction and spiritual enlightenment. Victim speech is
justified in part as promoting the psychological and spiritual well-
being of the speaker. 155 Indeed, the purpose of the penal system has
increasingly been seen in relation to the spiritual and psychological
needs of victims. This is especially true of that assemblage of judicial
and penal practices that composed the United States system of capital
punishment at the turn of the twenty-first century. The massively
extended United States prison system is publicly justified primarily as
a way to protect American communities against criminal assaults on
their persons and property (and there is no reason to doubt it is
understood in just those terms by the general public). In contrast, the
death penalty is coming to be seen in large part as a practice defined
by the needs of the victims. 156
151. E.J. DIONNE, WHY AMERICANS HATE POLITICs 77, 301 (1991).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 20 (emphasizing that Horton's release played into the public's fears that
convicted rapists and murderers were being set free).
154. Id. at 20, 77, 301.
155. Supporters of victim impact evidence in capital trials have argued that denying
victims the opportunity to speak at capital trials hinders their effort to overcome the
traumatic effects of victimization. See Bandes, supra note 13, at 405.
156. As Franklin Zimring has pointed out, the exoneration of non-capital prisoners
poses little threat to the survival of imprisonment because the prison remains essential to
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The clemency hearings held in Illinois after Governor Ryan
announced that he would consider the mass clemency of prisoners on
death row offered an exceptional moment of frank speech, as if mass
clemency was matched by a mass moment of parrhesia. The sheer
scale of the "horror" expressed by the long list of families became a
factor in the thinking of reporters assigned to cover the hearings. The
families spoke formally and directly to the Governor, and many of
them made this confrontational quality explicit. The nature of the
mass clemency made the truth expressed by the capital crime victims
relevant-not only to the question of any particular sentence of
death, but also to the very existence of a death penalty. All three of
these aspects intensified the parrhesiastic quality of capital crime
victim speech. The hearings demonstrated the extraordinary power
released by this kind of truth telling in contemporary politics,
especially its ability to overwhelm expert based systems of political
information as exemplified by the Illinois Capital Commission, whose
highly critical report on the Illinois capital punishment system led
Governor Ryan to pursue clemency in the first place.
A. Frankness
When capital crime victims testify as part of the sentencing phase
of trials, their testimony is tightly controlled through examination by
the prosecution and the rules of courtroom decorum. The capital
crime victim is not allowed to comment directly on the suitability of
the death sentence. The form of his testimony is strictly limited to
that which is not considered overly prejudicial. While prosecutors
played a key role in mobilizing capital crime victims to testify at the
clemency hearings, they seem to have done little to shape the content
or form of those hearings. The statements actually made by families
during the clemency hearings were particularly unrestrained. In that
sense they epitomize "frankness" in the sense of rawness:
"He [Fedell Caffey] was conceived in hell. God would not have
created such a waste of life. So please, send him back." '157
"If you or the governor need someone to pull the switch or
make the injection, I volunteer. Not that I'm a vindictive man,
our contemporary means of security from crime. ZIMRING, supra note 2, at 61. In
contrast, even supporters of the death penalty understand that it is no longer an essential
tool of security. Id.
157. Christy Gutowski, Killers' Pleas Fail to Sway Panel Officer, Life Sentence
'Insufficient' for Couple Formerly of Schaumburg, He Says, CHI. DAILY HERALD
(Arlington Heights, II1.), Oct. 17, 2002, at 1.
1404 [Vol. 82
CAPITAL CRIME VICTIM SPEECH
but I'll kill him (Fedell Caffey) myself if it's a problem for the
state or the Governor.'
158
"So what (the governor is) trying to make everybody believe,
that we have a broken system and the death penalty is flawed
and all these cases are flawed, is bull -," he said. "It's bull-.
And we get tired of it.'
159
"This isn't justice ... justice is that man dead."1
In the view of journalist observers, this gave the hearings a
newsworthiness that belied their length. "Though the audience has
grown smaller and the legal arguments more repetitive, the sobs of
victims' family members have never lost their anguish, and the details
of the crimes are rarely less than shocking."''
B. Truth
Like the victim impact statement, the clemency hearings
produced testimony that constituted its own validity. The victims'
statements concerned beliefs and experiences to which they are the
only possible observers and which are self-affirming.
"Fedell Caffey never gave my little girl an opportunity to grow
old. I have missed her being a teenager, her sweet 16th birthday,
teaching her to drive, warning her about boys, wiping her tears
away when she was sad and seeing her smile."
"Our pain will only go away when Robert Turner draws his last
breath."1
62
But while victim impact evidence is focused on the question of
the appropriate sentence in a particular case, the testimony of the
capital crime victims at the clemency hearings produced a truth
relevant to the question of whether the death penalty was itself a
legitimate penalty. Even prosecutors were apparently amazed at how
effective the capital crime victims' testimony was in altering the spin
the media put on the issue. A journalist who had become
communications director for the Cook County state's attorney's office
158. Id.
159. Adriana Colindres & Chris Dettro, Families Angry at Governor, STATE
JOURNAL-REGISTER (Springfield, I11.), Oct. 18,2002, at 1.
160. Id. (statement of Cynthia Sheperd, sister of Robert Webb, who was murdered in a
Bloomington, Illinois liquor store robbery along with two others).
161. Keilman, supra note 9, at 1.
162. Colindres & Dettro, supra note 159, at 1.
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said:
And so it was hard to explain to some veteran prosecutors who
marveled at how the news coverage of the recently concluded
death row clemency hearings was so poignant, so riveting. I
tried to explain that reporters have children, have mothers and
fathers, and siblings, and so when they heard this parade of
horrors for nine unprecedented days their psyches were
seared.
163
In an editorial calling on Governor Ryan to call off the clemency
process altogether, the Chicago Tribune emphasized that the victim
testimony had produced the truth of the death penalty: "Their agony
does not by itself certify a convict's guilt, but it does reiterate why
Illinois citizens, through their elected representatives, have enacted
and sustained capital punishment."'"
C. Danger
As with victim impact statements, capital crime victims testifying
at the clemency hearings exposed themselves to danger of
experiencing new trauma in recalling the old:
"When I found out that George Ryan was doing this
(considering the death penalty cases), the thing that hit home
for me was it was just like my brother being murdered again.'
1 65
"Governor Ryan is making us suffer all over again.""
"It just makes my whole body tremble, inside and out, when I
think of the horrible way my daughter and grandchildren had to
die."1
67
To the extent that we see the crime victim primarily as pitted
against the defendant, the scenario of victim impact statements and
the hierarchical aspects of parrhesia are lacking since the defendant is
under the control of an armed state. But the Greeks also considered
speech about criminal punishment to be a paradigmatic instance of
parrhesia, as in Orestes, when the topic was debated in the agora."6 A
163. John Gorman, The Public Winced in the Face of Their Pain: Clemency Hearings
Surprised Death Penalty Foes, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 29, 2002, at 19.
164. Editorial, Halt the Anguish, Gov. Ryan, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 20, 2002, at 8.
165. Colindres & Dettro, supra note 159, at 1 (quoting Cynthia Sheperd, sister of
murder victim).
166. Id.
167. Gutowski, supra note 157.
168. Euripides, supra note 83, at 884-931.
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subject of parrhesiastic oratory was precisely whether Orestes and his
sister should be put to death for murder. The speech of the crime
victim is to the jury, which may or may not accept his truth and in
refusing it may injure the victim. Consider the capital crime victim
who provides victim impact testimony in the penalty phase of a
capital murder trial, only to have the jury return a life sentence in a
context where the only choices are death and life. In the clemency
hearing context this hierarchy is even more striking. The capital
crime victim is speaking directly to the chief executive of the state.
Prosecutors also spoke at the clemency hearings, and their
speech often rivaled the victims' speech for its frankness. Peoria
County State's Attorney Kevin Lyon's addressed the clemency board
concerning death row inmate Joseph Miller: "If there is a hell that is
nothing but fire and the eternal damnation of the soul, then hell
should be the home of Joseph Miller." 169 Their speech acts were not
perceived as having the kind of power that victim speech had. Their
frankness is not redeemed in the classic logic of parrhesia by the risk
they take; the pain of re-experiencing the murders is not theirs. They
respond to no duty to seek death since the public interest may lie in
either life imprisonment or death. The prosecutors belong to
government and cannot speak from below in a hierarchy of power.
D. Criticism
While the clemency hearings had as their formal purpose to
inform the Governor's lawful exercise of his clemency powers, the
circumstances of the Illinois clemency hearings in the fall of 2002
presented a different context. Usually clemency comes before the
Governor in a passive mode, through the motion of an inmate facing
execution and having exhausted his appeals. 170 Here the Governor
initiated the process by announcing his intent to review the cases of
all then on death row.17' The capital victims were explicit in
addressing themselves to Governor Ryan and in their criticism of his
consideration of impeding the death penalty. Donna Jacobs, mother
of JoAna Bollinger, who was raped and murdered in her home at
seventeen, testified to the Prisoner Review Board in terms that
implied the Governor as the ultimate interlocutor: "We as her family
169. Keilman, supra note 9.
170. See Michael Heise, Mercy by the Numbers: An Empirical Analysis of Clemency
and its Structure, 89 VA. L. REV. 239, 241 (2003) (stating that a clemency petition is usually
a defendant's final plea for relief from state execution).
171. See Lee Hockstader, Dead Men Walking, WASH. POST Feb. 23, 2003, § W
(Magazine), at 24.
14072004]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
want him to know that Paris Sims deserves the death penalty. '" 172
The statements also reflect the way that the elements of
parrhesiastic speech accumulate and reinforce each other. The truth
telling and the danger help constitute the criticism. Sam Evans, the
father and grandfather of murder victims, testified about his own
truth relationship with his surviving grandchildren. Evans's daughter
Debra was murdered in order to harvest her ready to be born fetus.
173
The killers, Fidell Caffrey, her ex-lover, and Jacqueline Williams, his
girlfriend, also murdered two of Evans other children, sparing only a
twenty-two-month old baby that was the offspring of an earlier
relationship between Caffrey and Evans.174 Evans told the Prisoner
Review Board "I have comforted the boys for almost seven years
with the fact that they (Caffey and Williams) would be put to death,"
he said. "Now what do I say to them? This is wrong. We have no
closure-no end to this horrible nightmare." '175
This is classic parrhesia. The truth produced here is totally
internal. The grandfather, one capital victim, has comforted two
grandchildren, themselves capital victims, with the promise that a
death sentence would be carried out against the killers. This is a truth
that belongs only to them. The pain of having that promise made
false is knowable to them and only to them. But it is a pain in which
the sovereign is hugely implicated. The promise of that execution had
been forged in the verdict of the Illinois court that sentenced Caffey
and Williams to death. Now Governor Ryan's announced review of
Illinois death sentences had called that promise into question.
Evans's parrhesiastic act is also one of danger, not because an
affronted sovereign would seek his life (Ryan chose not to even
attend the sessions and responded to the victims in apologetic tones
throughout), 76 but because the speaker will be further damaged by
the testimony and Ryan's pursuit of the potential commutations.
E. Duty
As with victim impact statements, testimony at the clemency
hearings reflects just the kind of duty-based speech required for
parrhesia. It is not a general duty of all citizens, as would be the
172. Bill Bell, Jr., Victims' Families Urge Panel to Keep Killers on Death Row: Illinois
Governor Ordered the Unprecedented Review of All Death Penalty Cases, ST. Louis POST-
DISPATCH, Oct. 17, 2002, at B1 (emphasis added).
173. Gutowski, supra note 157.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Editorial, supra note 164.
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testimony of a witness to a crime (whether a victim or not). If a
capital crime victim chooses not to participate in victim impact
evidence, or in a clemency hearing, she cannot be compelled to do so.
Neither is it an act motivated mainly by desire for self-improvement
or therapy. Indeed, capital crime victims often testify about the
suffering they experience as a result of the process. Instead, it can be
assumed that virtually all capital crime victims that participate in
either process act out of a sense of duty to their murdered family
members. In the clemency process this sense of duty is enhanced by
the sense that a death sentence, whether sought or not by the family,
has now been judged appropriate by the action of a capital sentencing
process and is now subject to being taken away by the Governor's
clemency power.
CONCLUSION
The Illinois clemency controversy was a battle not just between
death row inmates and capital crime victims, but also between two
distinct mechanisms for the production of truth. One mechanism is
the expert commission177 that studies a crime or social problem and
designs a remedy based on empirical investigation and the best
current social science theories. While the Illinois Governor's
Commission on Capital Punishment was not a formal party in the
clemency process, its report and recommendations for reforming the
death penalty, coupled with the legislature's refusal to act on the
reform proposals, were undoubtedly the prime movers behind
Governor Ryan's willingness at the outset to consider mass clemency.
The other mechanism is the speech of individuals psychically
wounded by the murder of a close relative in an especially atrocious
crime. While power in modern societies has often been tied to the
production of truth by and about the individual, through mechanisms
177. This form is ubiquitous at all levels of government in the American political
structure. Well known modern examples in the criminal justice field include: the National
Commission on Law Observance of 1928, known popularly as the "Wickersham
Commission," see U.S. WICKERSHAM COMM'N, ENFORCMENT OF THE PROHIBITION
LAWS (1931); the President's Commission on Crime and Law Enforcement of 1966,
popularly known as the "Katzenbach Commission," see PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE
SOCIETY (1967); and the President's Commission on the Assassination of President
Kennedy of 1964, popularly known as the "Warren Commission," see PRESIDENT'S
COMM'N ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY, REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY
(1964). Riots have been particularly productive events for producing Commissions. See
generally ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE POLITICS OF RIOT COMMISSIONS 1917-1970 (1971)
(assessing the political implications and internal dynamics of riot commissions).
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like religious or legal confession, life-history, and psycho-therapy, the
kind of truth produced by the capital crime victims in the clemency
hearings was quite different in ways that this Essay has attempted to
draw out through a comparison with the ancient Greek practice of
parrhesia. Unlike religious or legal confession, the parrhesiastic
speech of capital crime victims is not closely inscribed by the
questioning techniques of professional investigators or clergy. Unlike
therapy, this speech must involve danger and duty. It is not about
self-improvement. It must be addressed to those who can exercise
power on a matter of consequence, perhaps of life and death. Only
then is it "fearless speech" in the way ancient Greeks would have
recognized.178
Both mechanisms operate as part of the exercise of power by
governments, especially chief executives like governors. In Illinois,
Governor Ryan appointed the Governor's Commission, which
reported to him. The clemency hearings were in front of members of
the Prison Review Board, but they heard testimony as representatives
of the Governor. The clemency power belonged solely and without
qualification to the Governor. Governor Ryan's ultimate decision to
grant mass clemency to everyone then on death row (except those
that were pardoned) represents at best a mixed triumph for the
modern "tradition" of the expert commission. "A majority of the
convicts would never have been sentenced to death had they been
prosecuted under the rules proposed by the Governor's own blue
ribbon commission." '179 But the perception of the journalists covering
the clemency hearings was that impact of the Governor's Commission
report was overwhelmed by the fearless speech of the capital crime
victims:i8 ° "While Ryan ultimately sided with the Commission, there
is little evidence that a politician with more of a political future would
have." '181 "The debate over reforming the capital punishment system
was quickly overpowered by the emotion of it all, leading Ryan to
retreat and say he was having 'second thoughts' about granting a
178. Of course, any actual example of capital crime victim speech may violate these
features, and whole categories of speech, like victim impact statements, may undercut the
likelihood of its parrhesiastic potential being achieved, but that only means parrhesiastic
victim speech is a limited category.
179. Hockstader, supra note 171.
180. See Steve Mills & Christi Parsons, Tears Send a Message: Hearings' Emotional
Impact Surprises Death Penalty Foes, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 27, 2002, at C1 (describing the
impact of emotional testimony at the clemency hearing); Editorial, supra note 164.
181. See, eg., Hockstader, supra note 171 (observing that "in making himself a lame
duck, [Governor Ryan] had also freed himself from the political considerations and
consequences attached to the death penalty").
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blanket commutation for the state's condemned prisoners. 182
Journalists saw the victim testimony as directly displacing the
words of the Governor's Commission. "The issues that had defined
the death penalty debate for more than two years-bad lawyering,
police misconduct, the use of unreliable witnesses-have faded, at
least for now.' 1 83 The recommendations made by the commissioners,
then before the Illinois legislature, were less likely to be adopted
because of the "truth" that the hearings had revealed.S 4 More
importantly, the sense that concern about operation of the death
penalty now extended beyond those generally opposed to it, the
essence of the claim that a new abolitionism is forming was dealt a
blow. An editorial in the Chicago Tribune, the newspaper most
responsible for problematizing the Illinois death penalty, stated:
The hearings of recent days have exposed the mere notion of
mass clemency as something that can be embraced only by
those who flat-out oppose the death penalty. For the majority
of citizens that favor a death penalty, the hearings have been a
powerful reminder of why many proven killers on Death Row
have fully earned the penalty that should await them.1
5
To some observers, this result is a reliable manifestation of the
general preference of at least the American public (if not publics
generally) for anecdote over analysis. Whether this stems from the
structure of cognition or the ideological structures of the reigning
hegemony, it has often been thought to drive American policy
generally186 and especially in the crime field.1" "Perhaps more than
anything the hearings have made clear what seasoned observers have
always known: When playing to a jury, true-life emotional stories will
always trump a dispassionate case analysis. ' 188  Seen as a cultural
practice, however, the power of victim speech goes beyond whatever
cognitive or ideological advantage anecdote has over analysis.
Presidents like Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton have won praise for
182. Mills & Parsons, supra note 180.
183. Id.
184. Editorial, Why Clemency Imperils Reform, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 29, 2002, at 20. The
clemency hearings have only made voting for reform in the upcoming veto session a bigger
challenge for Illinois legislators. Id.
185. Id.
186. See generally E.J. DIONNE, WHY AMERICANS HATE POLITICS (1991) (arguing
that Americans have lost faith in democratic institutions and that politics has become
increasingly abstract, causing Americans to view it with boredom and detachment).
187. See generally STUART SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF STREET CRIME (1990)
(describing street crime, the politics behind street crime, and future policy).
188. Mills & Parsons, supra note 180, at 1.
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adept use of anecdote in their speeches.189 But these speech acts,
whatever their effectiveness, were not parrhesiastic. They took no
risk. They obeyed no duty. They spoke not from below, but from
above. For all these reasons, they could be and were attacked by
their political opponents in ways that parrhesiastic speech cannot.
One of the unintended effects of the resurrection of the death
penalty in the United States since 1972 has been to reopen a space
within contemporary democracy for ancient parrhesia (or something
newly invented but with many of the same features). As we consider
the normative significance of these developments let us follow
Foucault's lead in asking not what capital victim speech is, but how it
becomes a problem for law and for society. From this perspective we
can see the Governor's Commission and the capital crime victims as
forms of parrhesiastic speech. With its focus on the fearless
production of truths for which validation lies internally in the very
character and experiences, parrhesia lends itself to populist
expression but also, oddly, to the expert.
Commissions work (when they do) through the individual
character and expertise of the commission members whose personal
integrity and deep knowledge are expected to validate conclusions
produced largely through empirical study by social science trained
staff members or contract experts. Serving on such commissions is
almost always a reflection of a strong sense of duty to the political
community. It involves the production of public pronouncements to
the sovereign and the "agora" and comes with a degree of risk to
those commissioners whose conclusions may anger powerful leaders
or outrage a volatile public."9
As long as we have a death penalty, we are likely to see a
growing role for the truth produced by capital crime victims. Even if
the Supreme Court were to reverse itself again on victim impact
statements, this would remove only one, and arguably the least
parrhesiastic form of capital crime victim speech. Clemency and
parole hearings will remain a very potent path (and any mass
clemency will magnify this effect qualitatively). 91 Commissions and
189. Howard Kurtz, Some Managed-Care Sagas Need Second Exam, WASH. POST,
Aug. 10, 1998, at Al (noting that both Reagan and Clinton effectively used anecdotal
evidence for policy purposes).
190. A good example of this in the Illinois context is Scott Turow, best-selling author
and attorney, who both served on the commission and became the most vocal advocate of
a new abolitionist reading of its conclusions. TUROW, supra note 4, at 9-11. Whatever the
merits of his position, he clearly took a major risk in alienating his popular reading
audience given the breadth of support for the death penalty in the United States.
191. Indeed, the Illinois legislature adopted changes in the clemency proceedings which
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other experts engaged in parrhesia share with the speakers that
Euripides valorized in the Orestes the fact that their truth, while
personal, was also grounded in hard won experience. In contrast,
capital crime victim speech shares much with the dangerous parrhesia
that the playwright associated with the appeal of emotions that are
uneducated by experience and enduring social roles. The danger of
our current death penalty is that it provides a virtual agora for
enticing and amplifying the kind of speech that in ancient Greece
destabilized and discredited democratic judgment.
One place to start is with the problematization of parrhesia in
ancient Greece. Philosophers and dramatists who reflected this
important cultural practice of truth making neither embraced nor
dismissed it, but raised questions about it. They recognized that in
democracies, neither the status requirements of parrhesia nor the
risk-taking of speaking to a king could reliably assure its validity.
First, who is entitled to produce parrhesiastic truth, not simply in
terms of status, but according to ability? In the capital crime victim
context, we need to ask all kinds of uncomfortable questions about
who is a capital crime victim, what role prosecutors play in defining
who is such a victim, and whether they can speak. Second, how do we
prepare one to speak the truth? In the capital crime victim context,
we must ask how the capital process itself alters and affects the
injuries which the victim is testifying about. The problem of how to
cultivate a capacity for parrhesia became a subject of philosophical
and spiritual expertise in ancient Greece, and it may also be necessary
to engage in such a discussion in postmodern America.
will have the effect of making governors ultimately more accountable to victim speech by
requiring them to provide reasons for overriding the recommendation of the appointees
who have actually conducted the clemency hearings.
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